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Whether a function should be performed within or outside government is a very broad issue that 
relates to personal values and views concerning the relationship between individual nd state, as 
well as a complex set of management issues. Without trying to answer those questions here, this 
article begins from the premise that a particular function has been judged by the political process 
to be the responsibility of government. The article seeks to develop an approach for government 
managers to use when deciding whether to perform the function directly in-house or to perform the 
function i directly through t e use of a non-governmental organization. The first part of this article 
begins by delineating distinguishing characteristics of government, onprofit, and private organi- 
zations, and then assesses the degree to which those characteristics impede or facilitate he perfor- 
mance of public functions. The article then develops a framework and a method for making 
privatization decisions. The decision to privatize requires strategic thinking; this article provides 
an example of how a strategic framework might be applied by analyzing the issues that would be 
faced in privatizing a key element of New York City's homeless program. 
A new element has found its way into government de- 
cision making in the United States as public officials are 
asked to justify government funding of services and di- 
rect government provision of services. Whether a job 
belongs within or outside government is a very broad 
policy issue that relates to personal values and views con- 
cerning the relationship between the individual and the 
state. Without trying to answer that question here, this 
article begins from the premise that a particular function 
has been judged by the political process to be the respon- 
sibility of government. The article seeks to develop an 
approach for deciding how the function should be car- 
ried out-directly by government, or indirectly through 
the use of a non-governmental organization. 
This is a decision that government managers must make 
every day. The first part of this article examines what 
might be termed the "functional-matching" approach to 
privatization. It begins by delineating the distinguishing 
characteristics of government, nonprofit, and private or- 
ganizations, and then assesses the degree to which those 
characteristics impede or facilitate the performance of a 
carefully defined set of typical public functions. The sec- 
432 Public Administration Review * July/August 2001, Vol. 61, No. 4 
ond portion of this article seeks to put the theory into 
practice by beginning the process of developing a frame- 
work and a method for making such decisions. The func- 
tional-matching process outlined here requires strategic 
thinking. It is not a straightforward, formulaic set of tasks: 
It requires decision makers to ask a number of critical 
questions and then to use their judgment and experience 
in framing a decision. 
Approaches to Privatization 
The modern impulse toward privatization is motivated 
by various perceived problems that it seeks to solve. The 
first is the supposed inefficiency of public enterprises due 
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to the absence of the profit motive. The resources ob- 
tained by managers in the government sector may not be 
related to the revenues they generate, but to the impor- 
tance of the service they deliver. The justification of costs 
is more important than the potential for revenues. In the 
private sector, operating resources and capital investments 
tend to be based on the potential for payout. By remov- 
ing the relationship of revenues to expenditures, it is dif- 
ficult to impose a downward pressure on costs, and there- 
fore efficiency is not always rewarded. The second is the 
problem of over-formality-too many rules governing 
hiring, purchasing, budgeting, and the scope of activities 
that may be undertaken by an organization. The third is 
political influence in the process of managing activities. 
A fourth problem, more common outside the United 
States, is state ownership and financial losses from en- 
terprises that do not perform traditional governmental 
functions (airlines, steel mills, shipyards, railroads, auto 
factories, phone companies, etc.). 
Most scholars of public administration assert that effi- 
ciency, organizational informality, and apolitical manage- 
ment are not the only values that organizations should be 
designed to pursue. Taken to extremes, efficiency, infor- 
mality, and depoliticization of management would be op- 
posed by advocates of privatization as well. Consider the 
following extreme examples: 
* Efficient law enforcement might execute presumed mur- 
derers on the spot to save the costs of legal processes 
and incarceration. 
* An organization without rules and structure would prob- 
ably not have an accounting system and might simply 
disperse funds from a big box of cash in a drawer. They 
might hire staff and promote them on the basis of race 
or gender. 
* An organization implementing a program without po- 
litical concerns would feel no pressure to be account- 
able for decisions and might be free to use impoverished 
elementary school children as a labor force. 
In a complex, interconnected society and economy there 
are, in fact, no purely private organizations. All firms are 
regulated and must be sensitive to legal, social, cultural, 
and political constraints. Most private firms pay consider- 
able attention to their public image and customer relations. 
Conversely, government organizations are not immune to 
considerations of efficiency. Local governments are quite 
sensitive to the limits of their tax base and to the need to 
keep costs as low as possible. Therefore, we are not deal- 
ing with differences of kind, but of degree. How regulated 
is the organization? To what degree does the organization's 
culture and management promote cost consciousness? To 
what degree is the organization sensitive to its public im- 
age, and how much does it worry about political support 
and opposition? 
Government leaders who are designing and implement- 
ing public programs must decide whether to provide gov- 
ernment or private organizations with the resources and 
authority to carry out programs. On what basis should this 
issue be decided? What framework can decision makers 
use to make this choice? While there is no simple answer, 
a number of public management scholars have addressed 
this issue. In The Privatization Decision, John D. Donahue 
states, "The choice between public and private has two basic 
dimensions. The first dimension concerns financing: 
Should we pay for some good or service individually, out 
of our own resources, or should we pay for it collectively 
with funds raised through one form or another of taxation? 
The second dimension concerns performance: Should the 
good be produced or the service delivered by a govern- 
mental organization or a nongovernmental organization?" 
(Donahue 1989, 7). 
The goal of Donahue's book "is to develop and illus- 
trate a set of principles to guide the allocation of publicly 
financed tasks between governmental and nongovernmen- 
tal organizations" (10). To succeed at this task, one faces 
the difficulty of distinguishing the operational properties 
of governmental organizations from those of non-govern- 
mental organizations. In actuality, there is a great deal of 
overlap. One fundamental distinction in the United States 
is that government organizations have a formal authority 
relationship to officials whose leadership role is obtained 
and legitimized through democratic elections. This rela- 
tionship allows them to do things that private organiza- 
tions should not do, such as incarcerate people. It makes 
government organizations more sensitive to political pres- 
sure and, in appropriate circumstances, insulates them from 
certain considerations of price and efficiency. 
Out of the historical and political environments from 
which privatization originates, three distinct streams of 
privatization theory have emerged. The first stream holds 
that the private sector is superior to the public sector. Ac- 
cording to this view, private organizations tend to be more 
efficient than government organizations due to the influ- 
ence of the profit motive and the bottom line. By this inter- 
pretation, the more private organizations are involved in 
the delivery of government services, the more efficient and 
cost effective those services tend to be. As public-choice 
theorists would argue, it is the competitive marketplace 
that produces goods and services efficiently. In a study 
conducted by the International City/County Management 
Association, Jeffrey Greene examines the levels of 
privatization in American cities. According to Greene, the 
basis of privatization stems from public-choice theory, 
whose proponents argue that "inefficiency is an inherent 
characteristic of municipal bureaucracies because of the 
incentive structures that encourage empire building and 
overproduction" (Greene 1996, 633). Thus, this first stream 
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of thought views the private sector as having an edge over 
the public sector by its very nature. 
A second approach to privatization was put forward by 
David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992) and was later 
termed "the competition prescription" by Don Kettl (1993). 
According to this view, the key factor that inspires effi- 
ciency is not the sector in which an organization operates, 
but whether it must compete for market share, functions, 
and resources. From this perspective, the problem of orga- 
nizational waste and inefficiency occurs in both sectors 
and stems from habits born of monopoly. 
The third stream in privatization theory is what might 
be termed "functional matching." Assuming the absence 
of monopoly, certain functions are most efficiently and 
effectively performed by the private sector, others by the 
nonprofit sector, and others by government. For example, 
police functions are properly governmental; nursing care 
is often best delivered by nonprofits; and private-sector 
firms often excel in construction and other manufacturing 
functions. In the case of police functions, the exercise of 
police authority might result in the loss of an individual's 
life or liberty. This requires a high level of clearly assign- 
able accountability. Constitutional government and the rule 
of law have been specifically developed to ensure that de- 
cisions are codified, visible, and accountable. I would ar- 
gue that where accountability is a critical value in the ex- 
ecution of a program, that program tends to be best 
implemented directly by government. 
Nursing care provides another example for examination. 
While accountability is an issue in this program area, the 
critical day-to-day value that is of highest priority is the 
requirement hat personnel be motivated by high levels of 
compassion. Nonprofits have a particular expertise in re- 
cruiting such individuals and infusing them with a strong 
sense of mission. Private firms may be capable of recruit- 
ing and rewarding such compassion, but only to the de- 
gree that compassion does not reduce profits, market share, 
and/or return on equity. 
On the other hand, manufacturing and certain service- 
support functions are best performed by competing, profit- 
seeking organizations. There is no particular sensitivity, 
such as individual liberty or the need for compassion, 
that must be taken into account during these production 
processes. 
It is a premise of this article that the three sectors differ 
in ways that matter, and those differences should be taken 
into account when developing a program's management 
strategy. Understanding these sectoral distinctions is an 
essential step in developing a framework for deciding when 
and where to privatize. While it is possible to define bor- 
ders between the three sectors and their characteristics, it 
is also clear that these boundaries are porous and there 
tends to be overlap among the sectors. In the context of the 
434 Public Administration Review * July/August 2001, Vol. 61, No. 4 
public and nonprofit sectors, for example, a recent theme 
of discussion has been a concern over a bluffing of bound- 
aries. Attention has been directed, for example, toward in- 
creased state funding of nonprofit organizations and the 
consequent greater susceptibility to influence, and the fact 
that nonprofits are increasingly drawn within the reach of 
state regulation (Gidron, Kramer, and Salamon 1992; 
Milward 1996). While it is true that there is much overlap 
between the sectors, it is my argument that there are still 
useful distinctions to be made. Such distinguishing char- 
acteristics may not provide anything resembling neat an- 
swers, but they can provide some help in deciding where 
and when to privatize. 
With a functional-matching approach to privatization, 
organizations involved in formulating and implementing 
public policy must make the classic business make-or-buy 
decision: Should we do this ourselves, or should we buy it 
from someone else? Do we want to build and maintain 
distinctive competence in this area, or is this activity out- 
side of our core functions? In making this choice, the func- 
tional-matching approach assumes that public policy must 
sometimes pursue values other than efficiency. 
This article accepts the functional-matching approach 
to privatization, but then seeks to address the following 
central issue: What criteria does one use when matching 
functions to organizational sectors? 
Distinguishing Characteristics among 
the Three Sectors 
The debate about distinctions between the public and 
private sector is a longstanding one in the field of public 
administration. Seventy years ago, Wallace Sayre was fond 
of saying that "public and private management are funda- 
mentally alike in all unimportant respects" (Allison 1982). 
Twenty years ago, Graham Allison sought to focus public 
management research on this issue. In a classic article in 
Public Administration Review, Hal Rainey, Robert Backoff, 
and Charles Levine (1976) identified points of consensus 
in academic literature on the similarities and differences 
between the two sectors. 
In that article, Rainey and his colleagues examined (1) 
environmentalfactors, such as appropriations, as a source 
of resources, legal constraints, and political influences; (2) 
organization-environment ransactions, in which govern- 
ment organizations tended to involve increased coercive- 
ness due to the possibility that "customers" have no choice 
but to participate and only one vendor from which to buy 
(such as Department of Motor Vehicles); and (3) internal 
structures and processes, which they found in government 
to have more complex and possibly conflicting goals. They 
found government managers to possess less autonomy and 
decision-making authority and weaker control over subor- 
dinates. They found government to be more formal, cau- 
tious, and less innovative than the private sector. Govern- 
ment incentive systems seemed unreliable and relied on 
financial rewards less frequently. 
In the 25 years since Rainey and his colleagues wrote 
their article, our society's focus on public management has 
brought some degree of change in these three areas-pub- 
lic organizational environment, environment-organization 
transactions, and internal structures and processes. Some 
governments have ended their monopolies on certain pub- 
lic services (such as garbage collection) and some have 
contracted out other functions. An antigovernment senti- 
ment has dominated the political environment of public- 
sector organizations. We see more governments delivering 
public services through private firms, which are permitted 
to operate on a fee-for-service basis. In those instances, 
government obtains resources in a less coercive manner 
than through taxation. In the third area of analysis, inter- 
nal structures and processes, we have seen significant 
change as government has moved to deregulate itself, while 
private management, paradoxically, finds itself in an in- 
creasingly regulated environment. Private firms find their 
human resource practices increasingly subject to litigation 
on grounds of bias, harassment, or other violations of civil 
rights and occupational health and safety rules. 
Yet the relative differences between the public and pri- 
vate sectors remain. Government remains unique because 
government actions still require legal authority and will 
always require such legitimation. While nonprofit organi- 
zations can be defined as private organizations that are sim- 
ply incorporated under a different section of the tax code, 
they are distinct from government and private for-profit 
organizations. Typically, like private for-profit organiza- 
tions, a self-perpetuating board of directors governs 
nonprofits. However, unlike for-profit private firms, they 
tend to be mission driven, and their property and excess 
revenue belong to the organization and are not distributed 
to shareholders, as in private firms. Still, nonprofit em- 
ployees do not necessarily take vows of poverty. These 
organizations may pay high salaries and bonuses and pro- 
vide lavish fringe-benefit packages as well. They also dis- 
tribute excess revenues to endowments, which has the ef- 
fect of increasing their financial stability and the security 
and salaries of their employees. 
The Effect of Distinctions among 
the Three Sectors 
Given the distinguishing characteristics of public, pri- 
vate, and nonprofit organizations, what are the implica- 
tions for a program's management strategy? Can public 
policy be implemented in any sector one chooses? Do 
these differences matter at all? To answer these questions, 
two fundamental questions must be addressed: Do the 
sectors differ in ways that affect the implementation of 
public programs? If they tend to differ, in what ways and 
under what conditions? 
One place to begin this discussion is with two types of 
governmental functions that private organizations seem 
poorly suited to perform: (1) those that regulate or remove 
the freedom or free movement of individuals; and (2) ac- 
tivities that have no obvious customer with the resources 
to provide a profit to the organization that performs it. 
Police and Regulatory Functions 
In many respects, the police function is a central role 
for government. The irreducible purpose of government 
is to provide the rules and means to enforce an end- 
what Hobbes termed the war of all against all (Sabine 
1961, 464). Still, governments hire mercenaries, and the 
provision of private security forces is currently a growth 
industry in the United States. Additionally, private firms 
manage some prisons. It is certainly possible to imagine 
a range of police and judicial functions that private firms 
could be used to perform. Arguably, however, these func- 
tions are a poor match for private-sector capabilities. First, 
decisions to apply force and to incarcerate individuals 
must be the responsibility of public officials. When pri- 
vate parties perform these tasks, we call it assault and 
kidnapping. The time and labor requirements of due pro- 
cess are not well served by an organization concerned 
with productivity and efficiency. In fact, criminal and civil 
justice may be one area where it is clear that efficiency is 
not as important as justice or fairness. In the end, the 
pursuit of these values is not what private for-profit orga- 
nizations are designed to do. 
While it is possible to imagine some niche roles for 
the private sector in criminal justice and policing, these 
functions require extreme levels of public accountability 
and are better suited to government. A similar argument 
can be made with respect to regulatory functions, which 
are also best suited to government control. Yet there is 
also a role for the private sector in regulation. One ex- 
ample is the use of private insurance as a method of self- 
regulation (Cohen and Kamineiecki 1991). Insurance 
companies may refuse to insure against risks unless cer- 
tified professionals have inspected the facilities. Build- 
ing owners in New York City are one example of such 
self-regulation. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
boiler explosions caused numerous apartment fires, 
prompting insurance companies to require boiler inspec- 
tions as a condition of issuing insurance. Soon thereaf- 
ter, boiler explosions became rare occurrences. This form 
of private self-regulation reduced fire losses and had the 
positive public outcome of saving lives. No government 
role was required. Owners insured their buildings out of 
A Strategic Framework forDevolving Responsibility andFunctions 435 
enlightened self-interest, and insurance companies re- 
quired safe boilers for the same reason. When interests 
align, government intervention becomes unnecessary. 
But what if a firm decides not to take out insurance? 
What if the danger is not to one's own property, but to 
someone else's? While a firm's concern about the impact 
of liability law might lead it to want insurance, some- 
times firms do not bother to insure or constrain risks. In 
the mid-1980s, for example, over one-third of the nation's 
underground gasoline tanks-the ones at the neighbor- 
hood gas station-were leaking. Valuable gasoline was 
leaking into ground water, soil, and basements all over 
the United States. One would have thought the compa- 
nies insuring these commercial establishments against 
property loss and liability judgments would have insisted 
that the tanks not leak, but they did not-government 
regulation was necessary to make such leaks illegal. The 
Environmental Protection Agency required gas stations 
to carry insurance that specifically covered damage from 
leaking tanks, believing that insurance companies would 
insist that the tanks be inspected and replaced if they were 
leaking. While some insurance companies did insist on 
inspections as a precondition of issuing insurance, in other 
cases the price of insurance increased and many insur- 
ance companies refused to insure underground tanks. The 
risk was greater than the payoff. This is a clear example 
of a police function that the private sector was asked to 
take on and was unable to perform. 
Services without Paying Customers 
A second area in which private organizations are not 
well suited to perform are those with no obvious cus- 
tomer to provide resources to the organization that per- 
forms the work. In New York City, government delivers 
services to homeless individuals and families through 
shelters run by both the government and nonprofit con- 
tractors. While some for-profit private firms, such as 
Lockheed, Maximus, and America Works, have entered 
the business of providing welfare services, it tends to be 
a functional area that resists privatization. However, as 
cost pressures increase in government, private firms are 
beginning to compete in this area and are pressuring 
nonprofits to develop more businesslike methods of op- 
eration (Ryan 1999). 
Nonprofit organizations can provide competition to 
government bureaucracies. They are also valued for their 
ability to recruit staff who are motivated by mission and 
do not demand high salaries. One reason that private 
firms are rare in social-service delivery is the need for 
customer subsidization by government and political sen- 
sitivity to poverty profiteering. When governments seek 
to privatize in this program area, they typically contract 
with nonprofit organizations. In Indianapolis, for ex- 
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ample, Goodwill Industries manages a great deal of the 
local Welfare-to-Work program. In New York City, a 
relatively large, well-funded nonprofit, Homes for the 
Homeless, uses private-sector financial controls and 
management systems to deliver efficient service to 
homeless families. Revenues that exceed expenses are 
reinvested in new services or endowment, and the con- 
tracting agency does not run the risk of a scandal over 
"excess" profits. This provides the government with 
some of the advantages of privatization, but also pro- 
vides the benefit of a staff that is mission driven and an 
organization that has a positive public image. 
Some programs have both paying and nonpaying cus- 
tomers. In the area of education, some taxpayers do not 
have school age children, and some taxpayers send their 
children to private schools. Some public school students 
are children of poor people who either do not pay taxes or 
whose taxes do not cover the full cost of education. In 
March 1999, a major controversy erupted in New York City 
when the chancellor of the city's one-million-student pub- 
lic school system resisted the mayor's effort to conduct a 
pilot experiment with school vouchers. In the chancellor's 
view, public education was threatened by the potential 
public funding of private education. 
The case of vouchers raises issues of public policy 
rather than issues of public management. Public educa- 
tion is an important civic investment that serves impor- 
tant public purposes. If you support the policy of univer- 
sal public education, vouchers can be seen as a threat to 
that policy and can be opposed as bad public policy. How- 
ever, in contrast to the police function of government, 
there is no reason that a private school cannot play the 
same education and socializing role as a government-run 
school. Private schools can be regulated to require diver- 
sity, and they are now regulated to ensure that govern- 
ment-imposed standards of learning are achieved. There 
is a benefit to competition as a method for keeping school 
administrations and teachers sharp and open to new ways 
of educating children. However, even if private schools 
can be made to perform some of the integration and so- 
cializing roles played by public education, they cannot 
perform the symbolic role of the public schools. Public 
education might be valued as an expression of our 
society's values and even as an element supporting a 
democratic political system. A similar policy argument 
has been made about the value of a universal draft re- 
quirement for military service. A professional, all-volun- 
teer army may be a better managed and possibly more 
capable organization than one comprising conscripts. 
However, the political impact of a citizen army is its ability 
to increase the visibility of war and peace-a goal that 
might transcend the goal of managerial efficiency. 
Privatization and Management Strategy 
What does this mean to the government manager who is 
seeking to decide whether to use government or private-sec- 
tor staff to perform a function? First, it means the decision 
to privatize is situational and must be considered as an ele- 
ment of organizational strategy. A framework for making 
those decisions must illuminate the strategic choices at is- 
sue and the potential impacts of particular choices. John 
Donahue utilizes principal-agent heory to express the vari- 
ables that affect the "make-or-buy" or "hire vs. contract- 
out" decision. Under this theory, the principal enters into a 
contractual relationship with an agent, who is expected to 
carry out the actions needed to produce the outcome desired 
by the principal. According to this framework, there are two 
fundamental problems with contracting: (1) adverse selec- 
tion-picking the wrong contractor, one who is not able to 
produce the desired outcomes; and (2) moral hazard-be- 
cause the agent's behaviors cannot be observed at all times, 
it is possible that even a capable organization will shirk its 
responsibilities and divert resources to other tasks or simply 
to profit. According to Donahue, 
The relative appeal of employing people, as opposed 
to contracting with them, increases (1) the more the 
task at hand is uncertain at the outset and prone to 
revision, (2) the harder it is to measure the value of 
production, (3) the more disruptive it is to switch 
agents in midstream, and (4) the more the principal 
knows about the best means to accomplish his task. 
Conversely, arms length contracts with outside sup- 
pliers are more attractive (1) the more precisely re- 
quirements can be specified in advance, (2) the more 
the principal cares about ends over means, (3) the 
more difficult it is to monitor fidelity to instructions 
(or the easier it is to measure results), and (4) the 
more readily incompetent or unfaithful agents can 
be replaced. (Donahue 1989, 45) 
Donahue's work begins to suggest some of the issues 
relevant to the privatization decision. However, other is- 
sues lie outside the principal-agent framework. One is the 
symbolic value of a public resource for the purposes of 
equity, fairness, and community building. For example, 
while it may be expedient to privatize schools to break up 
a moribund and poorly performing monopoly, the social- 
ization role played by public schools is sacrificed. A com- 
mon school experience for people of all backgrounds can 
be of great benefit to a society that stresses merit and class 
mobility. Even a private school with a large scholarship 
program does not educate rich and poor together as a mat- 
ter of right; instead, these opportunities are provided as an 
act of charity. One can say this is simply a case of the prin- 
cipal caring more about means than ends, but it is, in part, 
a concern for issues beyond the instrumental relationship 
of ends to means. 
The issue is not one of interorganizational relations, but 
a broader set of issues that includes the way we define 
ourselves as a society and touches on public morality, public 
and governmental ethics, collective, shared sacrifice, and 
community building. These are concepts that are beyond 
the reach of principal-agent theory because the public and 
its institutions are both principals and agents. Tasks can- 
not be contracted out because doing the work and partici- 
pating in decision making is part of the output and out- 
come of the program. 
The privatization decision should be seen as situational 
and context laden. Some services, such as policing, are 
difficult for private firms to perform successfully. Other 
services, such as education and military service, may be 
better managed by private organizations, but, due to the 
importance of other values, should not be privatized. This 
leads to the conclusion that a strategic framework is useful 
for analyzing the privatization decision, one in which 
privatization is part of a broader framework that includes 
history and other contextual factors in an analysis that re- 
lates ends to means in designing a program. Steven Cohen 
and William Eimicke have observed, "A strategy attempts 
to delineate the resources that will be used to pay for spe- 
cific activities designed to accomplish specific objectives. 
Strategy formulation begins with the identification of ob- 
jectives and the determination of methods for reaching 
objectives. These objectives and activities are then scaled 
to fit within resource constraints. Each element of a strat- 
egy (objectives, activities and resources) is constrained by 
political, social, economic and environmental variables. 
The objectives and activities of public organizations are 
constrained by the formal authority provided by statute" 
(Cohen and Eimicke 1995, 196). 
A strategic orientation requires us to relate means to 
ends and to ask how our goals might best be achieved 
given the fiscal, political, social, and economic context 
within which we operate. The analysis might begin with 
principal-agent considerations, but then should follow 
with an explicit consideration of the real-world context 
that constrains economic and all other rationalities. It 
must include a discussion of the purpose and goals of 
the community. Government programs have production 
functions and can be seen as having principal-agent re- 
lations, but they also have other objectives beyond task 
accomplishment. 
A Strategic Framework for Making the 
Privatization Decision 
A strategic framework for addressing privatization may 
be developed in the form of a set of questions that should 
be asked by government organizations faced with the de- 
cision of whether to privatize. While other questions could 
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certainly be asked, the privatization-strategy formulation 
process would benefit from raising the following issues: 
1. What are the goals of the program we are planning? 
1a. Are there any political or social/cultural constraints 
on contracting with private for-profit firms to do 
this work? 
lb. Are there any political or social/cultural constraints 
on contracting with a nonprofit organization to do 
this work? 
Ic. To what degree might this goal and its associated 
activities be considered a mission or an aspect of a 
mission? 
Id. Can the goal of this program be used to motivate 
staff? If so, how? 
2. What are the tasks that must be performed to achieve 
the program's goals? 
2a. Who designs these tasks? 
2b. Who is permitted to provide input in program and 
task design? 
3. Does the government currently have the capacity to 
perform these tasks? 
3a. Are there other organizations with more experience 
in performing these tasks? 
3b. Which organizations have demonstrated the most 
efficiency in performing these tasks? 
3c. How well developed is the technology needed to 
implement these tasks? 
3d. How risky is the technology used to perform these 
tasks? 
4. How measurable are the outputs and outcomes of the 
activities we are seeking to undertake? 
4a. Is data collection feasible and simple? 
4b. Can data be verified? How easy is it for those 
carrying out these activities to lie about work per- 
formed, the outputs produced, and the impacts 
obtained? 
5. How capital intensive is the activity? 
5a. Are the costs and availability of capital issues? 
5b. If so, are private or public sources of capital more 
or less available and expensive? 
6. How much risk is involved in performing this activity? 
6a. What risks are involved? 
6b. Could private providers obtain insurance to cover 
personal risks and third-party liability? 
7. What is the impact if the activity is performed poorly? 
7a. Are the impacts irreversible? At what price might 
they be reversed? 
7b. What is the potential political, social, and economic 
impact of failure? 
8. Is there a competitive market for the activity we are 
considering privatizing? 
8a. How deep is the market? Does it operate in this 
locality? 
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8b. Would privatizing this function help create such a 
market? 
8c. What might be done to stimulate such a market? 
8d. Are there efficiency gains that might be obtained 
through privatization? 
9. What is the output expected from this activity? 
9a. Can it be measured? 
9b. How difficult is it to measure and report the ac- 
complishment of this output? 
10. What is the outcome or impact expected from this ac- 
tivity? 
1 Oa. Can it be measured? 
lOb. How difficult is it to measure and report these 
impacts? 
The following analysis of a privatization issue that might 
be faced in New York City's homeless program provides 
an example of how this framework might be applied. 
The Case of Privatizing Homeless Services in 
New York City 
New York City's Department of Homeless Services is 
the agency in the city responsible for providing housing 
and other social services to homeless individuals and 
families. The Department is divided into two program 
divisions, Adult Services and Family Services. Adult Ser- 
vices provides services to homeless single adults, man- 
aging 44 shelters that provide beds to about 7,000 people. 
In 1998, 36 of these facilities were operated by nonprofit 
organizations and eight were run by the city. The divi- 
sion also manages contracts with nine nonprofit outreach 
centers and six nonprofit outreach teams. The Division 
of Family Services manages or operates 68 family shel- 
ters (mostly run by nonprofits), 10 hotels, five special- 
ized residences, and three reception centers. Entry into 
the entire family services system takes place in a single 
location in the Bronx, at the government-run Emergency 
Assistance Unit. 
Homelessness is a very visible and emotional issue in 
New York City. During cold weather, people without shel- 
ter are in danger of dying from exposure to cold and ill- 
ness. Housing is expensive, and the low end of the housing 
market is underserved. Due to living and transportation 
patterns, even wealthy New Yorkers cannot avoid seeing 
the homeless, and the media continues to cover the issue 
extensively. 
Most of the homeless services provided by New York 
City have been successfully privatized and could be com- 
pletely privatized if the government chose to do so. The 
one service that remains completely government-run is 
intake for family services. The following analysis exam- 
ines the issue of privatizing the city's Emergency Assis- 
tance Unit. It addresses the relevant questions from among 
those listed above. 
The goal of the Family Services Division is to ensure 
that homeless families have shelter without creating long- 
term dependency on public resources to provide that shel- 
ter. The goal of the Emergency Assistance Unit, the 
division's intake center, is to screen applicants and then 
send them to an appropriate and available facility. The ad- 
ministration of the intake function necessarily requires the 
refusal of service. It is likely that any refusals would still 
require a government-staffed appeal process. If a family 
were rejected and subsequently harmed and was high- 
lighted by the local media, the political reaction might be 
intense. However, while an arms-length contractor rela- 
tionship might not insulate public officials from account- 
ability, if a contract were properly drawn, it might provide 
a mechanism for penalizing or terminating a contractor who 
performed poorly. 
The difficulty for any organization undertaking this in- 
take function is determining when to refuse service. While 
a nonprofit organization could inspire people around the 
mission of helping the homeless, it would be difficult to 
get such an organization to be tough-minded about refus- 
als. On the other hand, a for-profit private firm might be 
better at doing the work, but it might have a tin ear to- 
ward the politics of refusing aid to families claiming to 
be homeless. 
The tasks involved in homeless intake are fairly straight- 
forward: The central task is to determine eligibility for ser- 
vices and assign those who are eligible to particular shel- 
ters. While law determines the criteria, the staff of the 
Emergency Assistance Unit must design the specific tasks 
required to apply those criteria. Presumably, some of the 
service providers must be involved in the process, at a mini- 
mum providing data on current capacity. One problem with 
the current Emergency Assistance Unit is that homeless 
families waiting for placement or arriving too late in the 
day to obtain placement have taken to sleeping on the floor 
of the unit's offices. Despite these problems, government 
workers in the Department of Homeless Services currently 
have the most experience to perform these tasks. However, 
there is no reason that a competent private organization 
could not quickly learn these fairly routine tasks and do 
this work. There is no technological expertise needed to 
perform these tasks. Knowledge of some fairly simple stan- 
dard operating procedures and modest security presence 
are all that are needed to safely undertake this work. 
The outputs and outcomes of this work are also fairly 
straightforward: How many families come in for service? 
How many are referred? How many are rejected? What is 
more difficult is measuring the number of people who are 
discouraged from coming in for service and end up sleep- 
ing on the street. Given the large network of nonprofit pro- 
viders, it is difficult to know how many families find per- 
manent housing and leave the system. While it is fairly 
easy to lie in reporting these data, it is also very easy to 
audit and spot check the accuracy of reporting from a single 
intake unit. 
The capital needs of the intake function are quite mi- 
nor, while the shelters themselves can be large facilities 
requiring substantial capital for construction and renova- 
tion. The intake center can be a rented office or, if con- 
tracted, could be located in a city building, as it is now. 
The on-site risks are fairly routine, and the only liability 
concern might come if a court decided to assign liability 
to the organization if it denied benefits and the claimant 
were injured. 
The impact of performing this intake service poorly is 
significant. If eligibility is made too easy, the shelter sys- 
tem could be overwhelmed. If eligibility is administered 
too stringently, families could suffer from exposure, hun- 
ger, and other injury. Moreover, if a pattern of poor deci- 
sion making were uncovered and exposed by the media, it 
could damage the political standing of the administration 
supervising the contractor. While most mistakes could be 
corrected over time, the death of any rejected applicant 
would obviously be irreversible. 
There are a large number of nonprofit organizations in 
New York City with the capacity to perform these tasks. 
The private for-profit market for performing such a ser- 
vice is difficult to measure. It is unlikely that a large na- 
tional firm or a strong local market could be developed 
from privatizing a single intake facility. However, if a re- 
quest for proposal were carefully constructed or linked to 
the provision of homeless services, it might be possible to 
attract several large nonprofit organizations into a com- 
petitive-bidding process. 
Would it be worth it? Are there efficiency gains that 
might be obtained through privatization? Could a nonprofit 
vendor do a better job of delivering this service than gov- 
ernment? Certainly overhead and administrative costs could 
be lowered by contracting out. A detailed analysis of labor 
costs and productivity would be needed to determine if 
operating costs could be reduced. The goal of this activity 
is to ensure that families with no place to live are given 
temporary shelter. Other programs are responsible for per- 
manent housing and dealing with employment issues. Im- 
portant measures would include the number of families 
processed, number housed, and number refused. These 
outputs can be easily measured, and the number of fami- 
lies housed can be verified when cross-checked against 
actual housing sign-ins at family shelters. While some fami- 
lies might never make it to the shelter, over time the no- 
show rate should be measurable and possibly consistent. 
The impact of this service is that families in true need 
of shelter would receive housing and those not in need 
would be denied housing. However, a negative impact 
of this service would occur if people in true need were 
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denied housing and ended up with no place to live-a 
very difficult impact to measure. Often homeless fami- 
lies have been evicted from sharing arrangements with 
families and friends, and it is difficult for them to know 
whether they will have a place to stay if they are denied 
help by the government. 
Having completed this cursory strategic analysis, what 
advice would I give the New York City Department of 
Homeless Services? If the cost analysis indicates that a 
contractor could run the Emergency Assistance Unit for 
less money than the government, the function could suc- 
cessfully be contracted to a large nonprofit organization. 
To be successful, the Department of Homeless Services 
would need to develop a performance-measurement sys- 
tem and a strong audit and evaluation unit. It would also 
make sense to have a government employee on hand to 
review all service refusals and adjudicate on-the-spot ap- 
peals of refusals. In my view, the greatest risk to govern- 
ment comes from harm resulting from refusals. If a prob- 
lem of too few refusals developed, it could be remedied 
gradually with new procedures and training. 
Conclusion: Deciding to Privatize 
It is critical that government managers resist bias and 
easy assumptions in making the outsourcing decision. Data 
should be collected about operations, and the political and 
social context of the program area must be well under- 
stood before making the "make-or-buy decision." The ap- 
proach discussed here argues that, despite the difficulty in 
precisely delineating distinctions between the public, non- 
profit, and private sectors, such distinctions can be made 
at the operational level. They represent tendencies rather 
than absolute distinctions, and they should be factored into 
the decision to privatize a government function. 
Beyond the specific distinctions among the three sec- 
tors, I have argued for a strategic approach to privatization. 
Under this approach, decision makers should consider or- 
ganizational traits to be only one of a much broader set 
of political, economic, social, technical, and ethical is- 
sues that should be considered when making the "make- 
or-buy" decision. 
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